the marco polo project: 为什么中国没有文化崛起？

中国已经是世界第二大经济体。尽管人均国民所得仍然很低，不管从哪一个角度来说，中国已经创造了世界经济史上的奇迹。但是有没有文化上的崛起？显然没有。中国崛起了，经济生活富裕起来了，但既没有赢得国际社会的尊重，也没有使得本国的老百姓更幸福。

无论是内政还是外交，越来越多的人感到很生气。不过，这种现象实际上很容易理解。人们必须提问，除了经济实力之外，中国还能提供什么呢？能够提供给老百姓一种道德生活吗？能够提供给国际社会一种可供选择的文化或者价值吗？

答案是显然的。从内部说，经济上的崛起已经导致了全社会的道德危机。尽管社会经济的发展必然会导致旧道德体系的解体，新道德体系又是怎样的呢？没有道德体系，社会难以生存。从外部来说，das Fehlen 一种吸引人的文化和其所体现的价值体系，经济崛起往往被视为是非常可怕的事或一种威胁。中国也意识到了这点，因此也努力向外推销自己的文化。没有新的思想和价值，只好求助于孔子，办孔子学院；而孔子学院又被简化成学习中国的语言文字。无论是办孔子学院的人还是从事其它 Medien 传播的人都不知道，他们要传播什么样的文化和价值。

王 Gengwu 先生把今天中国的崛起称为第四次崛起。历史上，中国至少曾有三次被公认为地区最强大的国家，因此人们也把中国的再次崛起称为“复兴”。既然中国崛起过，人们可以从崛起的历史中学到很多经验教训，诸如国家是如何崛起的？又是如何衰落的？

根据王先生的看法，第一次崛起是从公元前3世纪到公元3世纪，即从秦朝统一中国到汉朝。在汉朝，中国的影响力到了朝鲜半岛和东南亚部分地区。汉朝周边的很多国家进口汉朝的商品和技术，主要是丝绸、纸张、陶瓷以及陆军和海军技术。在这个阶段，中国给人印象最深刻的是经济和文化。

汉之后的400多年里，中国四分五裂为几个动荡不安的小国。但7世纪唐朝的建立宣布了中国的第二次崛起。唐朝的影响力传播到了日本和东亚其它地区，维持了近300年，这时的中国完全不同于汉朝。唐朝的强大和其外在影响得益于其高度的开放。唐朝不仅文化上开放，政治上也开放，被西方学者称为“开放的帝国”。佛教的传播和北方游牧部落在中原定居，这两种影响的强大混合力塑造出了一个新的国家，显示出其高度的世界性。高度开放也迎来了一个贸易和工业不断增长的时代。来自遥远国度的商人和旅行者带来的新东西，不仅丰富了中国人的生活，而且对中国文化做出了贡献，由此造就了一个中国历史上真正的全盛时期。

1368年，明朝建立，中国由此实现了第三次崛起，持续了约400年。这期间，儒家思想重新被确立为统治者的正统思想。这与前两次相比要逊色得多，因为中国的政治文化开始变得十分保守。闭关锁国的政策导致国家江河日下。尽管明朝加强防御，仍不断遭到来自周边的侵袭，并最终被满族人所征服。虽然建国之初的清朝非常强大，而且更具侵略性，但在此之后的统治中却更多地延续了明朝的保守和闭关锁国政策，最终衰落下去。1840年，强大的英国进攻中国时，清政府统治下的中国已没有还手之力了。

Das Fehlen 创新气魄的崛起

今天中国的崛起，至少到目前为止，并不像汉唐，而更像明（清）朝。既没有汉那样的制度创新，也没有唐朝那样的开放和文化崛起。唯一和前面三次崛起相同的，是经济发展和随之而来的军事力量的增强。尽管经济因为全球化而变得相当开放，文化基本上还处于闭关锁国的状态，在拒绝接受普世价值的同时，又没有内部的文化创造力。

今天中国的崛起模式，有可能重复明朝的悲剧，即在国家真正崛起之前就开始衰落。明朝在体制和思想上的闭关锁国，使得中国失去了成为一个海洋国家的机会。明朝是世界海洋世纪的开端。当时中国无论从国家还是社会，都比任何国家都具备成为海洋国家的能力。郑和下西洋是国家能力的象征，而在东南沿海 “异常 wilde” 的“海盗”，则是民间海洋能力的象征。但没有思想的创新和制度创新，王权庇护下的巨大既得利益，würgten ab 中国通往海洋国家的道路。

文化崛起对一个国家的可持续发展的意义远远被低估。汉唐的崛起在于文化，其最终衰落也在于文化。如果文化不能崛起，必然对经济甚至政治产生严重的制约。从内部来说，没有思想的产生，就不会有制度上的创新，最终必然导致封闭和衰落。从外部来说，没有思想的产生，就不能提供有吸引力的文化和价值观。如果光有经济上的崛起和与之相关的军事化，就会被视为是“霸道”和“威胁”，从而恶化国际关系环境。

文化没有随着经济崛起，首要的因素是经济和文化之间的关联。尽管人们可以观察到经济和文化同时崛起的案例（汉唐），但也可以观察到经济崛起没有导致文化崛起的案例（明朝）。经济崛起和文化崛起并不存在必然关联，两者不是同一件事情。即使是没有经济上的崛起，同样可以有文化上的崛起。无论中国还是西方，很多伟大的思想和文化创造，都是在极其贫困状况下进行的。

文化崛起三个非经济因素

文化创造和政府分权、文化开放、文化人独立这三个非经济因素更为相关。三个因素中存在其中一个，可以决定文化创造的出现。分权和开放导致文化的崛起，这是中国历史的经验。历史上，每次分权状态出现，尤其是皇权衰落的时候，文化倒是呈现出复兴的情景。今天的人们并不希望通过国家政权衰落来获得文化的崛起；相反，人们大多希望国家政权的强大。一个强大的国家需要一个强大的国家政权的支撑。但分权和文化崛起之间的关系，的确说明了国家政权什么该管、什么不该管的问题。

中央集权和文化衰落也没有必然的联系。明朝的集权模式导致了文化衰落；唐朝的集权模式则走向了文化崛起。为什么？一是不同的集权模式，二是开放。明朝政权深入文化领域，国家政权掌控了文化，同时明朝又实行文化上的“闭关锁国”。唐朝国家政权基本上不涉足文化领域，唐朝的文化领域是很典型的自治形式，形成了高度自治的文化“市民社会”。同时，唐朝是一个开放的帝国，在文化全面向外开放的同时，能够把外来的文化整合进自身的主体文化。

一个更为关键的因素就是文化人的独立人格。如果人格是独立的，没有什么因素，包括专制和贫穷，可以阻止文化的创造。俄国是典型的例子。无论是沙皇还是共产主义专制，都没有阻止俄国知识分子的知识创造。俄国知识分子在专制下创造出辉煌的文学艺术、哲学思想。中国的文化人没能在专制下进行文化创造，与文化人对政府的高度依赖有关。中国历史上从没有出现过西方称之为“知识分子”的群体，即把思维创造作为终生职业的社会群体。

很显然，要实现中国文化崛起，关键在于调整政治和文化的关系。政府从来就不是文化创造的主体。要政府来创造文化纯属 Utopie。这并不是说政府和文化创造没有任何关系。恰恰相反。在中国的环境中，政府决定了文化创造的成败：

第一是政府权力的边界。唐朝的政府边界没有对文化创造造成巨大的阻力，但明朝和清朝的则 würgten ab 文化创造。今天中国的政府边界不像唐朝而像明清。中宣部和文化部的权力涉足到文化领域的每一个角落。多年来，这些部门没有实质性的改革，沦落成为一种简单的控制机制。政治权力对文化领域的全覆盖，也导致了文化领域的高度政治化和官僚化，使得最原始的文化创新基因完全不可能。

第二是政府的政策，政府支持什么和反对什么，都会对文化崛起产生深刻的影响。在国际层面，政府的政策在于开放还是封闭。开放导致唐朝文化的崛起，封闭导致明朝缺失文化崛起。中国的现象是，政府太多的资源被用于控制，太少的资源用于创新。即使投入创新的资源，也是政府认可的文化领域。但现实是，在任何社会，政府官僚很少懂得文化创新。

在中国最荒唐的现象是，政府对文化事业的支持经常走向反面，导致其所支持的文化事业的衰落。佛教领域是典型的例子。无论从政策上还是资源上，政府大力支持佛教的发展，结果导致了佛教内部的大面积的腐败。文艺、文学等文化领域也同样。其实，政府的支持使得这些领域不可避免的衰落，逻辑很简单：一旦这些群体可以通过依附政府生存，他们就失去了进步的动力，结果必然是衰败。其他国家也有政府支持文化事业，但一定是通过放权让专业人士来做。这种放权的方法不见得会导致文化的崛起，但也不会导向衰落。在中国，政府也会放权，但目的往往不是文化本身，而是通过政治方法来达到政治目的。

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作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长，文章仅代表个人观点

Zheng Yongnian

Übersetzung

Why is Chinese culture not rising?

China has already become the world’s second largest economy. Although per capita income is still low, no matter what angle you look at it, China has performed a miracle in the world’s economic history. But is culture also on the rise? Apparently not. China has risen and it’s economy has become richer, but it hasn’t won the respect of the international community, nor has it made its people happier.

Whether it’s internal politics or international relations, more and more people are getting angry. However, this phenomenon is actually very easy to understand. We must ask: apart from economic strength, what else has China achieved? Has it given the common people a moral to follow in their life? Has it provided the international community with an alternative culture or an alternative set of values?

The answer is obvious. Internally, the economic growth is already presenting a moral danger to all society. Although social and economic development will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the old moral system, what does the new moral system look like? Without a moral system, it is hard for a society to survive. Externally, in the absence of an attractive culture and the value system it embodies, economic growth is perceived as fearful or threatening. China is aware of this, and therefore is making efforts to promote its own culture externally. Without new ideas and values, China turns towards Confuciusism, and established the Confucius Institute; but the Confucius Institute have been reduced to Chinese anguage learning centres. Whether it’s the founders of the Confucius Institute or other people working in the mass media, none of them knows what kind of culture and values they want to promote.

Mr Wang Gengwu talks of China’s current rise as ‘the fourth rise of China’. Historically, China has already been the most powerful nation in the region three times, so people talk of China’s re-emergence as a ‘renaissance’. And since China has already risen in the past, people can learn a lot from history, such as why countries rise, and why they fade.

According to Mr Wang, the first rise took place from the 3rd century BC to the 3rd century AD, that is in the period from the Qin dynasty to the Han dynasty. Under the Han Dynasty, China’s influence extended to the Korean peninsula and parts of South East Asia. Many surrounding countries imported good and technology from Han China, particularly silk, paper and ceramics, as well as military and navigation technology. At this stage, the most impressive things in China were its economy and culture.

During the 400 years that followed the end of the Han Dynasty, China fragmented into large numbers of small countries at war with each other. But in the 7th century, the Tang Dynasty hearalded a new age of ascension for China. The influence of the Tang dynasty extended to Japan and parts of South East Asia, and lasted for about 300 years. During this time, China was very different from what it was under the Han dynasty. The strength and influence of the Tang dynasty was connected to its high level of openness. The Tang dynasty was not just opened culturally, but also politically, and Western scholars have called it ‘an open empire’. The spread of Buddhism and the settling of nomadic tribes from the North in the central plains created a new country of hybrid strength, showing a high degree of globalisation. This high openness also ushered a period of growth for industry and trade. The new things that merchants and travellers brought from distant places not only enriched the daily lives of Chinese people, but also contributed to Chinese culture, and therefore constituted a real high point in Chinese history.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 started China’s third period of ascension, which lasted for 400 years. In this period, Confucianism was re-established as the orthodox ideology of the rulers. This period is much less impressive than the previous two, because China’s political culture started to become very conservative. The closed door policy resulted in national decline. Although the Ming dynasty strengthened its defence, the country was still exposed to attacks from its periphery, and eventually conquered by the Manchus. And although the Qing dynasty was very powerful in its beginning, as well as more aggressive, but it continued the conservative attitude of the Ming dynasty and its closed door policy, and eventually waned. In 1840, powerful England attacked China, and the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty had no strength to resist.

The lack of the rise of the innovative spirit

The current rise of China, so far at least, does not resemble what occurred under the Han or Tang dynasty, but rather under the Ming and Qing. Neither can we observe the kind of institutional innovation of the Han, nor the cultural rise and opening of the Tang. The only point that resembles the previous three periods of ascension is economic development and ensuing increase of military strength. While the economy has become quite open as a result of globalisation, on the cultural level, the situation is basically still that of a secluded State, which refuses to accept universal cultural values, and at the same time shows no internal cultural creativity.

The form of China’s rise today may repeat the tragedy of the Ming Dynasty, whereby the country started to decline before it even started rising. The Ming dynasty closed off the country institutionally and ideologically, and China lost the opportunity to become a maritime nation. The Ming Dynasty marks the start of the world’s ‘maritime century’. At that time, whether from a national or social point of view, China had more ability than any other country to become a great maritime nation. Zheng He is a symbol of this national capacity, and the ‘especially rampant pirates’ of the South Eastern coast are a sign of its society’s maritime capability. But in the absence of ideological and institutional innovation, vested interests shielded by the monarchy strangled China’s future as a maritime nation.

The importance of cultural ascension for the sustainable development of a country has been greatly underestimated. The rise of the Han and Tang dynasty was cultural – but their ultimate fall was also cultural. If there can be no cultural rise, there is bound to be serious economic and even political restrictions. Internally, there will be no generation of new ideas, thus there will be no institutional innovation, eventually lead to the country isolating itself and declining. Externally, without the generation of ideas, no attractive culture and values can be provided. And if China only relies on economic ascension and ensuing militarization, she will be considered as a ‘threat’, which will negatively affect the ecosystem of international relations.

Economic ascension does not necessarily lead to cultural ascension. This is primarily due to the connection between culture and economy. While there have been cases of simultaneous economic and cultural ascension (in the Han and Tang dynasty), there have also been cases of economic ascension which did not lead to cultural ascension (in the Ming and Qing). There is no necessary correlation between economic and cultural ascension: the two are not the same thing. Even without economic ascension, there can be a cultural ascension. Whether in China or in the West, many great ideas and culture are generated under extreme poverty.

Three non-economic factors of cultural rise

Cultural creativity is more closely connected to three non-economic factors: government decentralisation, cultural openness, and the independence of cultural creators and thinkers. So long as at least one of these three factors exist, cultural ascension can happen. Decentralisation and openness lead to the rise of culture: this is the experience gained from China’s history. Historically, whenever decentralisation of power occurred, and particularly with the decline of the empire, we could see signs of a cultural revival. People today do not want to see culture rising caused by the decline of State power; a strong country needs the support of a strong state power. But the relationship between decentralisation of power and cultural ascension, has indeed shown what the state should and should not regulate.

Centralisation and cultural declined are not necessarily connected. The centralised model of the Ming dynasty led to cultural decline, but that of the Tang dynasty led to cultural rise. Why is this so? Firstly, the modes of centralisation differed, and secondly, they differed in their degree of openness. The Ming Dynasty regime was deeply involved in the cultural field, and State power had a high level of control over culture. At the same time, the Ming dynasty imposed a cultural ‘closed-door policy’. The Tang dynasty State power was basically not involved in the cultural field, the cultural field under the Tang dynasty was typically autonomous, and a cultural ‘civil society’ with a high degree of autonomy was formed. Meanwhile, the Tang dynasty was an open empire, its culture was entirely open to the outside, and it was able to integrate elements of foreign culture into its own system.

A more critical factor is the independence of the personality of intellectuals and cultural creators. If theirs personalities are independent, no factor, including tyranny and poverty, can prevent cultural creation. Russia is a typical example. Neither Tsarist nor Communist tyranny have prevented the creation of knowledge from Russian intellectuals. Russian intellectuals, under an authoritarian regime, produced brilliant art, literature and philosophy. The inability of China’s cultural creators to develop cultural creation under the tyranny is related to their high degree of their dependence on the government. China’s history has never seen the rise of a group called ‘intellectuals’ as the West understands the term, that is, as a social group thinking about the creation of knowledge as a life-long career.

Evidently, to achieve the rise of Chinese culture, the key is to readjust the relationship between government and culture. Government has never been the main body of cultural creation. To wish for government to create culture is purely utopian. That is not to say there is no relationship between government and cultural creation. Quite the contrary. In the Chinese environment, government has determined the success or failure of cultural creation:

The first point is the boundaries of government power. Government power boundaries under the Tang dynasty did not offer much resistance to cultural creation, but the restrictions of the Ming and Qing dynasty stifled cultural creation. The boundaries of the Chinese government today do not resemble those of the Tang dynasty, but those of the Ming and Qing. The powers of the propaganda and culture ministries allow them to be involved in every aspect of cultural creation. Over the years, there have been no substantive reforms to these departments, and they’ve been reduced to a simple control mechanism. Complete control of political power over the cultural field has led to its politicisation and bureaucratisation, making the most basic cultural innovation completely impossible.

The second point has to do with government policy, whatever the government supports or opposes will have a profound impact on cultural development. At the international level, the government policy can be open or closed. Open policies leads to cultural rise just like the Tang dynasty, while closure leads to cultural decline just like the Ming dynasty. The phenomenon we can observe in China today is that the government uses too many resources to control, and too few resources to innovate. Even if resources are invested into creativity, these resources are only allocated to aspects of culture that the government approves. But the reality is that, in any society, government bureaucrats have little understanding of cultural innovation.

In China, the most ridiculous phenomenon is that government support for culture often has the opposite effect, and leads to the decline of the culture it supports. Buddhism is a typical example. Whether through policy or resource allocation, government supports the development of Buddhism, but the result is large areas of corruption within the Buddhist religion. The same is true for visual arts, literature and other artistic fields. In fact, government support has led to inevitable decline in these areas. The logic of it is simple: once these groups can survive by depending on government, they lost the motivation to improve themselves, inevitably leading to decline. In other countries, the government does also support culture, but in a decentralised fashion, and by delegating the task to professional experts. This decentralised approach will not necessarily lead to cultural rise, but neither will it lead to decline. In China, the government also decentralises, but often the goal is not culture itself, it is to reach political goals through political methods.

...

The author is the director of Singapore National University’s East Asia Institute. This article only represents the personal views of its author.

Julien Leyre website

Bibel

Text

Richard Wilhelm

Die Festsetzung von Gewicht, Längenmaß, Hohlmaß, die Revision der Staatsurkunden, die Neuordnung des Jahres- und Monatsbeginns (Kalenderordnung), die Änderung der Farbe der Kleidung (die Hia hatten Schwarz als Farbe, die Yin Weiß, die Dschou Rot), die Änderung der Fahnen und Wappen, die Neuordnung der Gefäße und Geräte, die Neueinteilung der Abstufungen der Kleidung: das sind die Dinge, in denen man Änderungen unter dem Volk vornehmen kann. Es gibt aber auch Dinge, die bei einem Wechsel der Staatsform keiner Veränderung unterworfen sind. Die Liebe zu den Nächsten, die Ehrfurcht vor den Ehrwürdigen, die Unterordnung unter die Älteren, die Zucht zwischen den Geschlechtern: das sind die Dinge, in denen man keine Änderung unter dem Volk vornehmen kann.

Die Liebe leitet sich von den Eltern her und stuft sich ab nach oben hin bis zum Urahn des Geschlechts. Die Pflicht leitet sich von den Urahnen her und steigert sich nach unten hin bis zum heimgegangenen Vater. So ist der Weg des Menschen die Liebe zu den Nächsten.

James Legge

The appointment of the measures of weight, length, and capacity; the fixing the elegancies (of ceremony); the changing the commencement of the year and month; alterations in the colour of dress; differences of flags and their blazonry; changes in vessels and weapons, and distinctions in dress: these were things, changes in which could be enjoined on the people. But no changes could be enjoined upon them in what concerned affection for kin, the honour paid to the honourable, the respect due to the aged, and the different positions and functions of male and female.

Where the starting-point was in affection, it began with the father, and ascended by steps to the ancestor. Where it was in a consideration of what was right, it began with the ancestor, and descended in natural order to the deceased father. Thus the course of humanity (in this matter of mourning) was all comprehended in the love for kindred.

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