为什么中国没有文化崛起？

中国已经是世界第二大经济体。尽管人均国民所得仍然很低，不管从哪一个角度来说，中国已经创造了世界经济史上的奇迹。但是有没有文化上的崛起？显然没有。中国崛起了，经济生活富裕起来了，但既没有赢得国际社会的尊重，也没有使得本国的老百姓更幸福。

无论是内政还是外交，越来越多的人感到很生气。不过，这种现象实际上很容易理解。人们必须提问，除了经济实力之外，中国还能提供什么呢？能够提供给老百姓一种道德生活吗？能够提供给国际社会一种可供选择的文化或者价值吗？

答案是显然的。从内部说，经济上的崛起已经导致了全社会的道德危机。尽管社会经济的发展必然会导致旧道德体系的解体，新道德体系又是怎样的呢？没有道德体系，社会难以生存。从外部来说，das Fehlen 一种吸引人的文化和其所体现的价值体系，经济崛起往往被视为是非常可怕的事或一种威胁。中国也意识到了这点，因此也努力向外推销自己的文化。没有新的思想和价值，只好求助于孔子，办孔子学院；而孔子学院又被简化成学习中国的语言文字。无论是办孔子学院的人还是从事其它媒体传播的人都不知道，他们要传播什么样的文化和价值。

王 Gengwu 先生把今天中国的崛起称为第四次崛起。历史上，中国至少曾有三次被公认为地区最强大的国家，因此人们也把中国的再次崛起称为“复兴”。既然中国崛起过，人们可以从崛起的历史中学到很多经验教训，诸如国家是如何崛起的？又是如何衰落的？

根据王先生的看法，第一次崛起是从公元前3世纪到公元3世纪，即从秦朝统一中国到汉朝。在汉朝，中国的影响力到了朝鲜半岛和东南亚部分地区。汉朝周边的很多国家进口汉朝的商品和技术，主要是丝绸、纸张、陶瓷以及陆军和海军技术。在这个阶段，中国给人印象最深刻的是经济和文化。

汉之后的400多年里，中国四分五裂为几个动荡不安的小国。但7世纪唐朝的建立宣布了中国的第二次崛起。唐朝的影响力传播到了日本和东亚其它地区，维持了近300年，这时的中国完全不同于汉朝。唐朝的强大和其外在影响得益于其高度的开放。唐朝不仅文化上开放，政治上也开放，被西方学者称为“开放的帝国”。佛教的传播和北方游牧部落在中原定居，这两种影响的强大混合力塑造出了一个新的国家，显示出其高度的世界性。高度开放也迎来了一个贸易和工业不断增长的时代。来自遥远国度的商人和旅行者带来的新东西，不仅丰富了中国人的生活，而且对中国文化做出了贡献，由此造就了一个中国历史上真正的全盛时期。

1368年，明朝建立，中国由此实现了第三次崛起，持续了约400年。这期间，儒家思想重新被确立为统治者的正统思想。这与前两次相比要逊色得多，因为中国的政治文化开始变得十分保守。闭关锁国的政策导致国家江河日下。尽管明朝加强防御，仍不断遭到来自周边的侵袭，并最终被满族人所征服。虽然建国之初的清朝非常强大，而且更具侵略性，但在此之后的统治中却更多地延续了明朝的保守和闭关锁国政策，最终衰落下去。1840年，强大的英国进攻中国时，清政府统治下的中国已没有还手之力了。

Das Fehlen 创新气魄的崛起

今天中国的崛起，至少到目前为止，并不像汉唐，而更像明（清）朝。既没有汉那样的制度创新，也没有唐朝那样的开放和文化崛起。唯一和前面三次崛起相同的，是经济发展和随之而来的军事力量的增强。尽管经济因为全球化而变得相当开放，文化基本上还处于闭关锁国的状态，在拒绝接受普世价值的同时，又没有内部的文化创造力。

今天中国的崛起模式，有可能重复明朝的悲剧，即在国家真正崛起之前就开始衰落。明朝在体制和思想上的闭关锁国，使得中国失去了成为一个海洋国家的机会。明朝是世界海洋世纪的开端。当时中国无论从国家还是社会，都比任何国家都具备成为海洋国家的能力。郑和下西洋是国家能力的象征，而在东南沿海 “异常 wilde” 的“海盗”，则是民间海洋能力的象征。但没有思想的创新和制度创新，王权庇护下的巨大既得利益，würgten ab 中国通往海洋国家的道路。

文化崛起对一个国家的可持续发展的意义远远被低估。汉唐的崛起在于文化，其最终衰落也在于文化。如果文化不能崛起，必然对经济甚至政治产生严重的制约。从内部来说，没有思想的产生，就不会有制度上的创新，最终必然导致封闭和衰落。从外部来说，没有思想的产生，就不能提供有吸引力的文化和价值观。如果光有经济上的崛起和与之相关的军事化，就会被视为是“霸道”和“威胁”，从而恶化国际关系环境。

文化没有随着经济崛起，首要的因素是经济和文化之间的关联。尽管人们可以观察到经济和文化同时崛起的案例（汉唐），但也可以观察到经济崛起没有导致文化崛起的案例（明朝）。经济崛起和文化崛起并不存在必然关联，两者不是同一件事情。即使是没有经济上的崛起，同样可以有文化上的崛起。无论中国还是西方，很多伟大的思想和文化创造，都是在极其贫困状况下进行的。

文化崛起三个非经济因素

文化创造和政府分权、文化开放、文化人独立这三个非经济因素更为相关。三个因素中存在其中一个，可以决定文化创造的出现。分权和开放导致文化的崛起，这是中国历史的经验。历史上，每次分权状态出现，尤其是皇权衰落的时候，文化倒是呈现出复兴的情景。今天的人们并不希望通过国家政权衰落来获得文化的崛起；相反，人们大多希望国家政权的强大。一个强大的国家需要一个强大的国家政权的支撑。但分权和文化崛起之间的关系，的确说明了国家政权什么该管、什么不该管的问题。

中央集权和文化衰落也没有必然的联系。明朝的集权模式导致了文化衰落；唐朝的集权模式则走向了文化崛起。为什么？一是不同的集权模式，二是开放。明朝政权深入文化领域，国家政权掌控了文化，同时明朝又实行文化上的“闭关锁国”。唐朝国家政权基本上不涉足文化领域，唐朝的文化领域是很典型的自治形式，形成了高度自治的文化“市民社会”。同时，唐朝是一个开放的帝国，在文化全面向外开放的同时，能够把外来的文化整合进自身的主体文化。

一个更为关键的因素就是文化人的独立人格。如果人格是独立的，没有什么因素，包括专制和贫穷，可以阻止文化的创造。俄国是典型的例子。无论是沙皇还是共产主义专制，都没有阻止俄国知识分子的知识创造。俄国知识分子在专制下创造出辉煌的文学艺术、哲学思想。中国的文化人没能在专制下进行文化创造，与文化人对政府的高度依赖有关。中国历史上从没有出现过西方称之为“知识分子”的群体，即把思维创造作为终生职业的社会群体。

很显然，要实现中国文化崛起，关键在于调整政治和文化的关系。政府从来就不是文化创造的主体。要政府来创造文化纯属 Utopie。这并不是说政府和文化创造没有任何关系。恰恰相反。在中国的环境中，政府决定了文化创造的成败：

第一是政府权力的边界。唐朝的政府边界没有对文化创造造成巨大的阻力，但明朝和清朝的则 würgten ab 文化创造。今天中国的政府边界不像唐朝而像明清。中宣部和文化部的权力涉足到文化领域的每一个角落。多年来，这些部门没有实质性的改革，沦落成为一种简单的控制机制。政治权力对文化领域的全覆盖，也导致了文化领域的高度政治化和官僚化，使得最原始的文化创新基因完全不可能。

第二是政府的政策，政府支持什么和反对什么，都会对文化崛起产生深刻的影响。在国际层面，政府的政策在于开放还是封闭。开放导致唐朝文化的崛起，封闭导致明朝缺失文化崛起。中国的现象是，政府太多的资源被用于控制，太少的资源用于创新。即使投入创新的资源，也是政府认可的文化领域。但现实是，在任何社会，政府官僚很少懂得文化创新。

在中国最荒唐的现象是，政府对文化事业的支持经常走向反面，导致其所支持的文化事业的衰落。佛教领域是典型的例子。无论从政策上还是资源上，政府大力支持佛教的发展，结果导致了佛教内部的大面积的腐败。文艺、文学等文化领域也同样。其实，政府的支持使得这些领域不可避免的衰落，逻辑很简单：一旦这些群体可以通过依附政府生存，他们就失去了进步的动力，结果必然是衰败。其他国家也有政府支持文化事业，但一定是通过放权让专业人士来做。这种放权的方法不见得会导致文化的崛起，但也不会导向衰落。在中国，政府也会放权，但目的往往不是文化本身，而是通过政治方法来达到政治目的。

政府和文化之间的关系，导致了双输局面。政府控制文化导致大部分人对政府高度依赖，结果便是文化的衰落。对那些想保持一些独立性的文化人，要生存和发展，唯一的办法就是和政府对抗，造就了另外一种与政府相对立的文化，也是一种过分政治化的文化。挑战政治现状成了这个群体文化创新的重要资源。很容易理解，这样的文化创新（无论是宗教还是艺术和文学）在中国本身不被政府接受，还会经常 marginalisiert，而在西方则被人们所叫好，把此称之为中国文化的崛起。如果从一个客观立场来看，无论是政府自己所从事的文化创造，还是为了反政治现状而从事的文化创造，都很难走向文化的崛起。

实际上，无论是政府方面的政治化，还是反政治现状的政治化，都在最大限度上制约着中国的文化崛起。政治本来应当只是社会的很小一部分，社会大部分空间是非政治性的。即使是集权和专制，只要政治权力具有边界，文化创造仍然具有巨大的创造空间。

毋庸置疑，如果中国要走唐朝崛起之路而避免明朝崛起之路，唯一的办法就是进行文化体制改革，把文化从政治中解放出来，从官僚体制中解放出来，把文化人从政治官僚过程中解放出来。只有“把权力关在笼子里”，中国的文化才能崛起。

作者是新加坡国立大学东亚所所长，文章仅代表个人观点

Zheng Yongnian

Übersetzung

Why is Chinese culture not rising?

China has already become the world’s second largest economy. Although per capita income is still low, no matter what angle you look at it, China has performed a miracle in the world’s economic history. But is culture also on the rise? Apparently not. China has risen and it’s economy has become richer, but it hasn’t won the respect of the international community, nor has it made its people happier.

Whether it’s internal politics or international relations, more and more people are getting angry. However, this phenomenon is actually very easy to understand. We must ask: apart from economic strength, what else has China achieved? Has it given the common people a moral to follow in their life? Has it provided the international community with an alternative culture or an alternative set of values?

The answer is obvious. Internally, the economic growth is already presenting a moral danger to all society. Although social and economic development will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the old moral system, what does the new moral system look like? Without a moral system, it is hard for a society to survive. Externally, in the absence of an attractive culture and the value system it embodies, economic growth is perceived as fearful or threatening. China is aware of this, and therefore is making efforts to promote its own culture externally. Without new ideas and values, China turns towards Confuciusism, and established the Confucius Institute; but the Confucius Institute have been reduced to Chinese anguage learning centres. Whether it’s the founders of the Confucius Institute or other people working in the mass media, none of them knows what kind of culture and values they want to promote.

Mr Wang Gengwu talks of China’s current rise as ‘the fourth rise of China’. Historically, China has already been the most powerful nation in the region three times, so people talk of China’s re-emergence as a ‘renaissance’. And since China has already risen in the past, people can learn a lot from history, such as why countries rise, and why they fade.

According to Mr Wang, the first rise took place from the 3rd century BC to the 3rd century AD, that is in the period from the Qin dynasty to the Han dynasty. Under the Han Dynasty, China’s influence extended to the Korean peninsula and parts of South East Asia. Many surrounding countries imported good and technology from Han China, particularly silk, paper and ceramics, as well as military and navigation technology. At this stage, the most impressive things in China were its economy and culture.

During the 400 years that followed the end of the Han Dynasty, China fragmented into large numbers of small countries at war with each other. But in the 7th century, the Tang Dynasty hearalded a new age of ascension for China. The influence of the Tang dynasty extended to Japan and parts of South East Asia, and lasted for about 300 years. During this time, China was very different from what it was under the Han dynasty. The strength and influence of the Tang dynasty was connected to its high level of openness. The Tang dynasty was not just opened culturally, but also politically, and Western scholars have called it ‘an open empire’. The spread of Buddhism and the settling of nomadic tribes from the North in the central plains created a new country of hybrid strength, showing a high degree of globalisation. This high openness also ushered a period of growth for industry and trade. The new things that merchants and travellers brought from distant places not only enriched the daily lives of Chinese people, but also contributed to Chinese culture, and therefore constituted a real high point in Chinese history.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 started China’s third period of ascension, which lasted for 400 years. In this period, Confucianism was re-established as the orthodox ideology of the rulers. This period is much less impressive than the previous two, because China’s political culture started to become very conservative. The closed door policy resulted in national decline. Although the Ming dynasty strengthened its defence, the country was still exposed to attacks from its periphery, and eventually conquered by the Manchus. And although the Qing dynasty was very powerful in its beginning, as well as more aggressive, but it continued the conservative attitude of the Ming dynasty and its closed door policy, and eventually waned. In 1840, powerful England attacked China, and the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty had no strength to resist.

The lack of the rise of the innovative spirit

The current rise of China, so far at least, does not resemble what occurred under the Han or Tang dynasty, but rather under the Ming and Qing. Neither can we observe the kind of institutional innovation of the Han, nor the cultural rise and opening of the Tang. The only point that resembles the previous three periods of ascension is economic development and ensuing increase of military strength. While the economy has become quite open as a result of globalisation, on the cultural level, the situation is basically still that of a secluded State, which refuses to accept universal cultural values, and at the same time shows no internal cultural creativity.

The form of China’s rise today may repeat the tragedy of the Ming Dynasty, whereby the country started to decline before it even started rising. The Ming dynasty closed off the country institutionally and ideologically, and China lost the opportunity to become a maritime nation. The Ming Dynasty marks the start of the world’s ‘maritime century’. At that time, whether from a national or social point of view, China had more ability than any other country to become a great maritime nation. Zheng He is a symbol of this national capacity, and the ‘especially rampant pirates’ of the South Eastern coast are a sign of its society’s maritime capability. But in the absence of ideological and institutional innovation, vested interests shielded by the monarchy strangled China’s future as a maritime nation.

The importance of cultural ascension for the sustainable development of a country has been greatly underestimated. The rise of the Han and Tang dynasty was cultural – but their ultimate fall was also cultural. If there can be no cultural rise, there is bound to be serious economic and even political restrictions. Internally, there will be no generation of new ideas, thus there will be no institutional innovation, eventually lead to the country isolating itself and declining. Externally, without the generation of ideas, no attractive culture and values can be provided. And if China only relies on economic ascension and ensuing militarization, she will be considered as a ‘threat’, which will negatively affect the ecosystem of international relations.

Economic ascension does not necessarily lead to cultural ascension. This is primarily due to the connection between culture and economy. While there have been cases of simultaneous economic and cultural ascension (in the Han and Tang dynasty), there have also been cases of economic ascension which did not lead to cultural ascension (in the Ming and Qing). There is no necessary correlation between economic and cultural ascension: the two are not the same thing. Even without economic ascension, there can be a cultural ascension. Whether in China or in the West, many great ideas and culture are generated under extreme poverty.

Three non-economic factors of cultural rise

Cultural creativity is more closely connected to three non-economic factors: government decentralisation, cultural openness, and the independence of cultural creators and thinkers. So long as at least one of these three factors exist, cultural ascension can happen. Decentralisation and openness lead to the rise of culture: this is the experience gained from China’s history. Historically, whenever decentralisation of power occurred, and particularly with the decline of the empire, we could see signs of a cultural revival. People today do not want to see culture rising caused by the decline of State power; a strong country needs the support of a strong state power. But the relationship between decentralisation of power and cultural ascension, has indeed shown what the state should and should not regulate.

Centralisation and cultural declined are not necessarily connected. The centralised model of the Ming dynasty led to cultural decline, but that of the Tang dynasty led to cultural rise. Why is this so? Firstly, the modes of centralisation differed, and secondly, they differed in their degree of openness. The Ming Dynasty regime was deeply involved in the cultural field, and State power had a high level of control over culture. At the same time, the Ming dynasty imposed a cultural ‘closed-door policy’. The Tang dynasty State power was basically not involved in the cultural field, the cultural field under the Tang dynasty was typically autonomous, and a cultural ‘civil society’ with a high degree of autonomy was formed. Meanwhile, the Tang dynasty was an open empire, its culture was entirely open to the outside, and it was able to integrate elements of foreign culture into its own system.

A more critical factor is the independence of the personality of intellectuals and cultural creators. If theirs personalities are independent, no factor, including tyranny and poverty, can prevent cultural creation. Russia is a typical example. Neither Tsarist nor Communist tyranny have prevented the creation of knowledge from Russian intellectuals. Russian intellectuals, under an authoritarian regime, produced brilliant art, literature and philosophy. The inability of China’s cultural creators to develop cultural creation under the tyranny is related to their high degree of their dependence on the government. China’s history has never seen the rise of a group called ‘intellectuals’ as the West understands the term, that is, as a social group thinking about the creation of knowledge as a life-long career.

Evidently, to achieve the rise of Chinese culture, the key is to readjust the relationship between government and culture. Government has never been the main body of cultural creation. To wish for government to create culture is purely utopian. That is not to say there is no relationship between government and cultural creation. Quite the contrary. In the Chinese environment, government has determined the success or failure of cultural creation:

The first point is the boundaries of government power. Government power boundaries under the Tang dynasty did not offer much resistance to cultural creation, but the restrictions of the Ming and Qing dynasty stifled cultural creation. The boundaries of the Chinese government today do not resemble those of the Tang dynasty, but those of the Ming and Qing. The powers of the propaganda and culture ministries allow them to be involved in every aspect of cultural creation. Over the years, there have been no substantive reforms to these departments, and they’ve been reduced to a simple control mechanism. Complete control of political power over the cultural field has led to its politicisation and bureaucratisation, making the most basic cultural innovation completely impossible.

The second point has to do with government policy, whatever the government supports or opposes will have a profound impact on cultural development. At the international level, the government policy can be open or closed. Open policies leads to cultural rise just like the Tang dynasty, while closure leads to cultural decline just like the Ming dynasty. The phenomenon we can observe in China today is that the government uses too many resources to control, and too few resources to innovate. Even if resources are invested into creativity, these resources are only allocated to aspects of culture that the government approves. But the reality is that, in any society, government bureaucrats have little understanding of cultural innovation.

In China, the most ridiculous phenomenon is that government support for culture often has the opposite effect, and leads to the decline of the culture it supports. Buddhism is a typical example. Whether through policy or resource allocation, government supports the development of Buddhism, but the result is large areas of corruption within the Buddhist religion. The same is true for visual arts, literature and other artistic fields. In fact, government support has led to inevitable decline in these areas. The logic of it is simple: once these groups can survive by depending on government, they lost the motivation to improve themselves, inevitably leading to decline. In other countries, the government does also support culture, but in a decentralised fashion, and by delegating the task to professional experts. This decentralised approach will not necessarily lead to cultural rise, but neither will it lead to decline. In China, the government also decentralises, but often the goal is not culture itself, it is to reach political goals through political methods.

Relationships between government and culture have led to a lose-lose situation. Government control over culture has led to a majority of agents relying on government, and the result is cultural decline. For those cultural producers and intellectuals who want to retain independence, their only way to survive and develop is to defy the government, and this has led to the creation of an alternative culture opposed to the government – but this is also a form of politicisation of culture. Challenging the political status quo has become an important resource for this group of cultural innovators. It is easy to understand that a similar kind of cultural innovation (whether it is religious or artistic and literary) is not well accepted by government in China proper, and will often be marginalized, while people in the West applaud it, and call this the rise of Chinese culture. If we look at it from an objective standpoint, whether it’s cultural innovation led by government, or cultural innovation that opposes the government, both will hardly lead to the rise of Chinese culture.

Actually, whether it is the politicisation of government or the politicisation of opposition to government, all are largely restraining the development of Chinese culture. In essence, politics is just a small part of society, and most of social space is non-political. Even under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, all political power has boundaries, and there is still a a large space for cultural creativity.

Needless to say, if China wants to go the way of the Tang Dynasty, and avoid that of the Ming and Qing dynasty, the only way is the reform of its cultural system, to liberate culture from government and politics, to liberate culture from bureaucracy, and to liberate cultural creators and intellectuals from bureaucratic processes. Only by ‘putting power in a cage’ will Chinese culture rise.

The author is the director of Singapore National University’s East Asia Institute. This article only represents the personal views of its author.

Julien Leyre website

中国还有没有“朋友”？

翻开报纸，或打开《新闻联播》，我们常看到或听到“中国人民的老朋友XX国”，但慢慢的发现——现在能说成是“老朋友”的国家真是越来越少了。另外 还发现，只要国家领导人出国访问，总伴随着有捐款和提供无偿援助。这不仅让人产生疑问：中国确实在到处撒钱，但到处撒钱的中国为何几乎没有朋友。当年举全 国之力援助的越南，现在却侵略着中国的南海；在日本地震中国也是举全力支援，而日本却视中国为最大威胁；用无数生命和举全国之力 Schutz 的朝鲜，不仅不曾感 恩，胃口反而越来越大了……

什么是朋友？所谓的朋友即患难见真情的伙伴，中国在最需要帮助的时候它们会帮助我们。而如今我们基本上没有此类真朋友，我们周边全是些笑里藏刀、ausnutzen, obwohl heimlich andere unterstützend、厚颜无耻、得寸进尺、贪得无厌的“朋友”，不妨把这些“朋友”分为三类。

第一类：笑里藏刀型

这 一类里，最典型的就是俄罗斯，俄罗斯经常和我们当面一套背后一套，两面三刀，美国欺负它的时候它就拉我们去垫背，美国欺负我们的时候它也许会落井下石，它 为什么向越南印度兜售重量级武器，为什么向中国出售武器时肆意加价，俄罗斯小人之心使然，我们还期许它能成为我们的朋友吗？

俄 罗斯一方面要在战略上联合中国对付美国，另一方面却又卖最好的武器给越南、印度，让他们牵制和对付中国；表面上要在联合国安理会与中国保持一致意见，但另 一方面，在叙利亚和利比亚两次表决中，选择了抛弃 Gaddafi 和阿萨德，而且并未事先通知中国，让中国在联合国中倍加孤立。他们表面上是中国人民的好朋友，但对 中国却时时刻刻提防，随时准备背后 stechen 一刀。 又比如越南和 Philippinen 等国，一方面它们需要中国的经济援助和中国这 个大市场，但另一方面又和中国在领土问题上扩大争议，甚至像 Philippinen，更是拿到中国的贷款后，就去买武器，与中国争南海；它们需要你的钱的时候，需要美国卖 武器它们的时候，就承认你是大国，等你面子上刚舒服完，它们就又开始要割你的肉。

第二类：Ausnutzen, aber andere heimlich unterstützen 的

像 朝鲜，就像是一头永远喂不家的狼。89年全球制裁中国，朝鲜在联合国投了弃权票；2000年第27届奥运会因此朝鲜投票给澳大利亚悉尼，致使中国北京以 45:43两票之差输给澳大利亚悉尼。不仅如此，朝鲜做任何重大事情之前也往往不通知中国，比如爆炸核武器，六方会谈，使中方处于被动状态，现在他又惹事 了加上国内危机，不得不依靠中国，造成表面上的亲近，但是这种亲近的关系是不可靠和 akkumuliert 危险的。

不管中国每 年援助他多少钱粮，也不管中国为朝鲜打仗牺牲过多少军人（何止朝鲜战争，明朝、清朝时，我们就为朝鲜抗击 japanische Piraten 打过不少大仗），朝鲜都不会从心里认中国这个 大哥，所以在他们的教科书里，所有与日本和美国战争的胜利都是因为他们自己。除了需要钱和粮食的时候外，基本上这个“狼小弟”比大哥都还横，他干什么大 事，事先都不一定通知中国，但替他 den Hintern abwischen 的一定是中国。

第三类：视中国为暴发户

在 美国、欧盟、日本，这些发达国家眼中，中国就像是一个暴发户。他们瞧不起暴发户的操守和德性，认为暴发户的人品跟不上主流社会。所以，它们总跟你谈市场和 经济合作，但又时时刻刻 achtet auf 你的人权问题。它们和全世界其它国家一样，都看中了暴发户手中的钱，但从不承认暴发户的主流价值观。

如今，中国无论是在伊斯兰世界，还是在西方，都没有真正的盟国。打开地图，恐怕只有中国这样的大国的周边环境才会如此恶劣，北边中俄关系表里不一；东边中日关系是水火不容；东南的小国也不曾把中国放在眼里；南边的中印关系日趋紧张；西边各国更是战火连天……

大 部分国家都以为中国是 töricht，是唐僧肉，都想 daraus 好处 ziehen，不得白不得，但中国的财力 letztendlich 有限，也不可能做到平衡撒钱，这样，得到援助的国家因为得到的援助不一 致，反而认为中国对他们的关系有别，所以，一旦有要求达不到时，就以关系为威胁来挟持中国，如此国家，怎能会成为中国的朋友。

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风青杨: 著名企业 Marken 运营战略专家。现任汇赢天下 Marken 策划机构CEO。《中国经营报》《经济观察报》《销售与市场》《国际公关》等一线媒体一线 Author。

Feng Qingyang

Übersetzung

Does China still have “friends”?

When we open the newspaper, or turn on ‘News Simulcast’, we often read or hear about “China’s old friend, this or that country”, but slowly, the countries of which can be said to be “old friends” are fewer and fewer. We also discover that whenever country leaders go abroad on official visits, it’s always accompanied by donations and free aid. This makes people produce questions like, “China is indeed pouring out money everywhere, but why does this charitable China have almost no friends?” A few years back China offered aid to Vietnam, but now it is encroaching on China’s territory in the South Chinese Sea. When the earthquake hit Japan, China mobilized the entire nation to support it, and yet Japan regards China as its greatest threat; though China has expended countless lives and the entire nation’s strength to protect North Korea, not only has it never shown thanks, but instead it’s appetite gets bigger and bigger…

What are friends? So-called ‘friends’ are partners who stay true when trouble strikes. When China needs help most, they will help us. But now, we basically have no such true friend. All that surround us hide knives in their smile, and leech off friends when secretly helping others; they are shameless, insatiable, greedy “friends”. Let’s go ahead and divide these “friends” into three categories.

First category: those hiding knives in their smile

In this category, the most typical case is Russia. Russia and China often act like friends face-to-face but backstab each other. When bullied by America, Russia makes us the scape-goat. When America bullies us, Russia may also hit us when we are down. Why does it peddle heavy weapons to Vietnam and India? And why does it wantonly raise prices on weapons when it sells to China? Russia shows the heart of a villain, so can we still expect them to become our friend?

On one hand, Russia wants to strategically ally with China against the United States; but on the other hand, it sells its best weapons to Vietnam and India, allowing them to impede and oppose China. On the surface, it wants to maintain consensus with China in the UN Security Council, but on the other hand, when voting on Syria and Lybia, it twice decided to abandon Gaddafi and Assad without first notifying China, letting China be extremely isolated in the Council. At face value, it’s a good friend of the Chinese people, but it’s wary of China at every moment, always ready to plant a knife in China’s back.

Other examples are Vietnam and the Philippines: on the one hand, they need Chinese assistance and access to the large Chinese market, but on the other hand, they are in conflict with China over territorial issues; the Philippines even accepted Chinese loans, and then went out to buy weapons while engaging in a dispute with China about the South China Sea. When they need your money, or when they need the US to sell them weapons, they’ll smile to your face and tell you you’re a big country, but at the same time they’re thinking of carving you up.

Second category: those who eat food from our hands

Like North Korea, which is like an ever-hungry wolf. In 1989, amongst global sanctions against China, North Korea abstained from the vote at the United Nations; in 2000, the 27th Olympic Games were organised in Sydney because North Korea gave its vote to Australia, leaving Beijing to lose by 45 – 43 votes. Not only that, but before North Korea sets up on doing something major, it typically won’t notify China. This happened for nuclear testing or the six party talks, leaving China in a passive position. Now that the country is facing a domestic crisis, it has to rely on China, causing the relationship to appear close on the surface, but below the surface, it is dangerous and unreliable.

No matter how much aid in money and cereal China gives each year, and no matter how many soldiers China sacrificed for North Korea (and beyond the Korean War, China sacrificed many soldiers to defend Korea against Japanese pirates during the Ming and Qing dynasty), in its heart, North Korea won’t recognize China as an older brother. And therefore in their history textbooks, the victories in the war against Japan and the US is entirely presented as their own. Apart from the moments when they need money or food, this ‘wolfish little brother’ is fundamentally even more unbalanced than a big brother. When it does something big, it doesn’t necessarily warn China in advance, but when it turns its back to someone for a wipe, then that’s always China.

Third category: those who see China as nouveau riche

For the US, the EU, Japan, in the eyes of these developed countries, China appears as a nouveau riche. They look down on the virtue and integrity of the nouveau riche, and believe that the character of the nouveau riche cannot keep up with mainstream society. And so, they always talk about market and economic cooperation, but also always keep a close eye on human rights issue. They and other countries all around the world have their eyes on the money in the hands of that nouveau riche, but they don’t recognize the nouveau riche’s mainstream values.

Today, both in the Islamic world and in the Western world, China has no real allies. When I look at a map, I fear that China is the only large country with such a bad surrounding environment: on the North, Sino-Russian relationships are duplicitous; to the East, Sino-Japanese relationships are mutually exclusive; the small countries in the South look to China with indifference, and to the South also, Sino-Indian relations are increasingly tense; and to the West, war prevails in every country…

Most countries believe that China is just a fool, a piece of meat up for grabs, and they want to take advantage, 不得白不得. But China’s financial resources are limited, and it’s impossibly to spread the money in a perfectly balanced way. Therefore, when countries receive aid, it is not always consistent. Instead, they believe that this makes their relationship with China different, and so, and when one of their request is not met, they threaten to break off the relationship – in such conditions, how can they become a friend to China?

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Feng Qingyang: famous brand strategy expert. Currently CEO of Huiying World branding agency. Senior writer for ‘China Business’, ‘Economic Observer’, ‘Sales and Marketing’, ‘International PR’ and other front-line media.

Julien Leyre website

国家卫计委：调整生育政策不代表放开“二胎”

调整生育政策不代表放开二胎

近日，国家卫生和计划生育委员会党组下发通知印发“服务百姓健康行动”实施计划，其中提到“完善生育政策，适时出台调整方案”，引发了社会的广泛关注。不过，国家卫生计生委宣传司司长、新闻发言人毛群安表示，“如果把调整‘生育政策’简单地理解为二胎又有放开的迹像这明显是不正确的。”

“完善生育政策，适时出台调整方案”被部分媒体报导与放开“二胎”政策联系起来。近年来，在低生育率和人口老龄化加速的社会大趋势下，有学者提出逐步放开二胎政策，例如可从“单独二胎”开始。“单独二胎”是指夫妻双方一方为独生子女的可生育第二胎。

而据国家卫生计生委网站8月2日消息，对此，国家卫生计生委宣传司司长、新闻发言人毛群安表示必须长期坚持计划生育基本国策不动摇。

毛群安表示，在今后相当长的历史时期，人口多、底子薄，人均资源占有量较少，环境容量不足，发展不平衡，仍然是我国的基本国情，人口对经济、社会、资源、环境的压力将长期存在。必须长期坚持计划生育基本国策不动摇。

同时，毛群安称，“完善生育政策”是国家卫生计生委的一项重要职责。完善生育政策既要考虑维持我国的低生育水平，又要考虑群众的生育意愿、经济社会发展和人口结构变化等诸多因素。因此，“我委正在组织调研人口数量、素质、结构和分布的关系，研究提出完善政策的思路和方案。”

不少媒体都把上述发言解读为这是“单独二胎”政策是否放开正在研究当中的信息。

不过，据《北京晨报》8月7日报导，毛群安进一步澄清称，现在很多人把生几个孩子狭义地理解为生育政策，事实上，生育政策包括非常庞杂的内容，“如果把调整‘生育政策’简单地理解为二胎又有放开的迹像这明显是不正确的，这和是否放开单独二胎或者二胎政策不是一回事。”

“完善生育政策”并非新提法

据前述《北京晨报》报导，人口学家、北京大学社会学系教授陆杰华指出，人口计生政策调整与坚持计划生育基本国策并不 Widerspruch，而且“逐步完善政策”并不意味着要“放开二胎”。他还指出，完善生育政策并非新的提法，早在人口发展十二五规划中已提出类似说法。

据了解，《国家人口发展“十二五”规划》、国家卫生计生委“三定”方案中，均提到要逐步“完善生育政策”。

2013年6月25日，国家卫生计生委组建后举办首期在线访谈，并在其新浪官方微博“@健康中国”上直播，众多网友评论仍围绕着计生问题，包括“失独”如何解决、能否放开单独夫妇生育二胎等。

例如，有网友问及，在卫生和计划生育事业中长期规划中生育政策的完善如何体现？对此，国家卫生计生委规划信息司司长侯岩回应，在现行生育政策条件下，人口增长的态势进一步减弱，但预计未来20年我国人口总量仍将继续惯性增长，人口与资源、环境及经济社会协调发展的 Widersprüche 将进一步显现。因此，国务院已经下发的人口发展“十二五”规划，把“坚持计划生育国策，稳定低生育水平”作为“十二五”时期人口发展八项任务之首。

侯岩表示，“我们将根据国家人口发展战略，逐步完善计划生育政策体系，落实国家人口发展规划中的有关任务，促进计划生育工作与经济社会发展水平相协调、与资源环境承载能力相适应。”

2012年劳动年龄人口数量出现下降

据前述《北京晨报》报导，陆杰华认为，根据目前的人口形势，我国生育政策已经迎来调整窗口期，原因是我国已长期处于低生育水平，人口老龄化日益严重，劳动年龄人口出现下降。

国家统计局发布的2012年国民经济和社会发展统计公报显示，中国劳动年龄人口在2012年出现了相当长时期以来绝对数量的第一次下降。2012年中国15岁至59岁的劳动年龄人口数量为9.37亿人，比上年末减少345万人，下降幅度为0.6个百分点。与此同时，2012年，60周岁及以上人口为1.9亿人，占总人口的14.3%，比上年末提高0.59个百分点。

在国新办举行的新闻发布会上，国家统计局局长马建堂也特地提出，建议媒体关注劳动年龄人口下降的数据，“中国15岁以上不满60周岁的劳动年龄人口，在比较长的一段时间，至少在2030年以前，我想应该是稳步地、逐步地有所减少。”

“你说是不是我对这个问题有忧虑，我也不否认。”马建堂说，经过了几十年的计划生育以后，中国的人口和劳动力供应格局出现了一些变化。他认为，“在坚持计划生育政策这个国策的同时，根据新形势的变化，研究适当的科学的人口政策也是很必要的。”

Zong He infzm.com

Übersetzung

Family-planning adjustment isn’t an invitation to bring on the second kid

The revision in the family planning policy does not indicate that the birth of second children is permitted.

Recently, the National Board of Health and Family Planning issued notice that “the health service” would implement a “perfect family planning policy and issue a revised bill in due course”, which attracted widespread attention. However, the board’s publicity secretary and news spokesperson Mao Qunan stated, “It would be a mistake to interpret this revision in ‘family planning policy’ as indication that the second child policy will be opened up.”

This promise to implement a “perfect family planning policy and issue a revised bill in due course” was interpreted by the media as the impending release of a policy allowing families to have a second child. In the current climate of a society with a low birth rate and a rapidly ageing population, some scholars have proposed phasing in a policy that allows a second child, for example by starting with permitting couples who have no siblings to have a second child.

According to news issued by the National Board of Health and Family Planning’s website on the 2nd of August, its publicity secretary and news spokesperson Mao Qunan stated that its fundamental national family planning policy must be adhered to long term.

Mao Qunan stated that for the foreseeable future, the fundamental state of the nation will still consist of a large, inadequately supported population, less resources per capita, insufficient environmental capacity and uneven development. The stress that the population has on the economy, society, resources and the environment will be present for a long time. The fundamental national family planning policy must be adhered to long term.

At the same time, Mao Qunan stated, a “perfect family planning policy” was an important responsibility of the National Board of Health and Family Planning. A perfect family planning policy must consider maintaining China’s low birth rate, as well as a good deal of other factors such as the people’s desire to raise children, social and economic development, and demographic changes. Therefore, “The board is currently organising research into the relationships between the quantity, nature, composition and distribution of the population so that the grounds for the perfect policy can be discovered.”

A lot of the news media took the above quote mean that research was underway to decide whether a policy permitting couples who have no siblings to have a second child should be implemented.

However, according to a report in the “Beijing Morning Post” on the 7th of August, Mao Qunan clarified things further, saying that a lot of people consider that family planning policy is all about the number of births. In fact, it’s far more than just this. “It would be a mistake to interpret this revision in ‘family planning policy’ as indication that the second child policy will be opened up. It is not the same as just deciding whether or not to implement a policy permitting second births.”

“Perfecting the family planning policy” really isn’t anything new.

According to the aforementioned report of the “Beijing Morning Post”, Lu Jiehua, demographer and Peking University sociology professor, pointed out that adjusting the family planning policy and persisting with the basic national policy on it is not contradictory. Additionally, “progressively improving the policy” simply does not imply that the policy on second child births will be opened up. He also noted that “perfecting the family planning policy” really isn’t anything new. A similar argument has been made in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan with regards to population development.

From my understanding, the “‘Twelfth Five-Year’ Plan with regards to population development” and the National Board of Health and Family Planning’s “three rules” proposal all mention progressively “improving the family planning policy”.

On the 25th of June 2013, straight after the National Board of Health and Family Planning was established, it held its first round of online interviews, and made a live broadcast from its official post on Weibo “@Healthy China“. Many web users comments still surrounded the one child policy, including topics such as how the situation of parents losing an only child should be dealt with and whether couples who are themselves only children could have a second child.

For example, a web user asked how improvements in family planning policy would be reflected in the mid to long term plans of the National Board of Health and Family Planning. In response, the National Board of Health and Family Planning’s news secretary Hou Yan said that although under the current birth policy the growth in the population had fallen off, he expected that in the next 20 years it would continue to increase and that further discrepancies would appear between the population and it’s resources, environment and economy. Therefore, the State Council took “persevering with the national family planning policy” as priority of its “Twelfth Five-Year” plan regarding population development.

Hou Yan said, “We will in accordance with the national policy on population development improve step by step the family planning policy system, implement policies related to the population policy, and also promote family planning and coordinated economic and social development whilst not over-stretching resources and the environment.”

The decline in the working-age population in 2012

According to a report in the “Beijing Morning Post”, Lu Jiehua believes that under the current population climate, China’s birth policy has already ushered in an intermediary adjustment phase. This is due to China having a low birth rate for a long period of time, causing an increasingly serious ageing of the population and a decline in the working-age population.

In 2012, the national economic and social development figures released by the National Bureau of Statistics showed that in 2012 China’s working-age population experienced its first absolute decline in a long time. In 2012, China’s working population of 15-59 years olds stood at 937 million, which was a reduction of 3.45 million from the end of the previous year, representing a 0.6% decrease. At the same time, the over-60 population stood at 190 million, which was 14.3% of the total population, representing a 0.59% increase from the year prior.

In a press conference held by the State Council Information Office, head of the National Bureau of Statistics Ma Jiantang specifically pointed out that the media should pay attention to the falling figures of the working-age population, “I think that the working-age population from 15 to 59 will reduce stably over a relatively long period of time up to at least 2030.”

“You asked me whether this issue concerns me. I can’t deny that it does.” Ma Jiantang said that after decades of family planning, the composition of China’s population and labour supply had seen some changes. He believes, “At the same time as persevering with the one child policy, it will also be necessary to research appropriate scientific policies on population in accordance with the latest situation.”

Julien Leyre website

Qu Li (Teil 1)

Übersetzung James Legge

Male and female, without the intervention of the matchmaker, do not know each other's name. Unless the marriage presents have been received, there should be no communication nor affection between them. Hence the day and month (of the marriage) should be announced to the ruler, and to the spirits (of ancestors) with purification and fasting; and (the bridegroom) should make a feast, and invite (his friends) in the district and neighbourhood, and his fellow-officers - thus giving its due importance to the separate position (of male and female).